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PLUGGING THE RABBIT HOLE:  




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this era, technology is more than just prevalent. Billions across the world 
rely on technology for almost every aspect of their lives. Though perhaps 
unnoticed by the masses, there has been a dramatic shift in the technological 
landscape, particularly with respect to computer software.1 This shift has presented 
new issues in patent eligibility because abstract ideas by themselves are not 
patentable subject matter.2 Recently, the Supreme Court in Alice Corporation v. 
CLS Bank International,3 as in previous cases, chose not to address what defines 
an abstract idea. 4  In doing so, the Court has further perpetuated the difficult, 
subjective patent eligibility analysis performed by courts and patent examiners 
alike.5 This Note avers that the Court’s Mayo test used in Alice6 is insufficient and 
that supplemental requirements will provide further clarity and a more consistent 
patent eligibility review. The supplemental requirements are twofold: (1) An idea 
is abstract if it necessarily includes or relies on an intangible element of no 
physical dimension; and (2) the claims must be calculated to quantitatively 
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1 Natalya Dvorson & Mark C. Davis, Through the Looking Glass: Exploring the 
Wonderland of Patent Subject Matter Eligibility After Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
International, LANDSLIDE, Nov./Dec. 2014, at 8, 9. 
2 Id. 
3 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
4 Id. at 2357. 
5 See Stephen T. Schreiner & Brendan McCommas, The Patentability of Financial 
Processes After the Supreme Court’s Alice Decision, 131 BANKING L.J. 777, 785 (2014) 
(arguing that a “case-by-case inquiry results in a certain amount of uncertainty that can be 
mitigated”).  
6 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
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Specifically, Part II includes information regarding the Alice case itself, pre-
Alice case law on patent eligibility, and the post-Alice aftermath. Part III includes 
an in-depth discussion on the proposed supplemental requirements, application of 
the proposed supplemental requirements to post-Alice decisions, alternative 
solutions, and two case studies on granted patent applications overcoming Alice 
rejections. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
Section 101 of the Inventions Patentable provides, “Whoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”7 However, the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged for over one hundred years “an important implicit 
exception: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not 
patentable.”8 Here, the goal is to play the middle ground between two ends of a 
spectrum. On one end: Upholding patents on laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
and abstract ideas would essentially provide a monopoly over the “basic tools of 
scientific and technological work,”9 thus “tend[ing] to impede innovation.”10 On 
the other end of the spectrum: The exclusionary principle of abstractness, if taken 
too far, could potentially swallow patent law since all inventions can be distilled 
down to, or rest upon some abstract principle or idea.11 With slippery slopes at 
both ends of the spectrum, Alice provided little guidance as to what an abstract 
idea is and when it is patentable.12 
 
A.  The Case 
 
Alice Corporation’s (“Alice”) patents claimed a “scheme for mitigating 
‘settlement risk,’ i.e., the risk that only one party to an agreed-upon financial 
exchange will satisfy its obligation.”13 Alice achieved this via a computer program 
that executes specific commands to calculate if sufficient resources exist to repay a 
debt, which ultimately determines whether or not a financial transaction is to be 
permitted.14 CLS Bank was facilitating currency transactions on a global scale and 
																																																								
7 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
8  Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)). 
9 Id. 
10 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. 
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94 (2012)). 
11 Id. 
12 Jesse Adland, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International: Challenges in Identifying 
Patentable Subject Matter, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Dec. 2014, at 20, 22. 
13 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2349. 
14 See id. 
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sought declaratory judgment against Alice that “the claims at issue are invalid, 
unenforceable, or not infringed.”15 Both parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment based on patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101; the district court’s 
ruling that the claims were patent ineligible was upheld in the Federal Circuit’s 
rehearing en banc,16 and subsequently by the Supreme Court.17 The next section 
discusses patent eligibility prior to Alice. 
 
B.  Pre-Alice: Case Law on Patent Eligibility 
 
Bilski v. Kappos18 was a seminal case in the realm of patent eligibility. There, 
the patent in suit claimed a method for hedging against the financial risk of price 
fluctuations in which the final step involved the implementation of a mathematical 
formula.19 There, the Court held the patent claimed an abstract idea20 and explained 
that risk hedging was a “fundamental economic practice.”21 Similarly, in another 
landmark case—Mayo—the claims addressed the measurement of metabolites in 
the bloodstream in order to determine the appropriate dosage of medicine to be 
administered to the patient.22 Though argued as a patent-eligible application of 
natural law (i.e., the human body’s production of metabolites) the Court held the 
claimed method patent ineligible because it was “well known in the art” and 
comprised “nothing significantly more than an instruction to doctors to apply the 
applicable laws when treating their patients.”23 To arrive at this conclusion, the 
Court used a two-part test, now commonly referred to as the Alice/Mayo Test: (1) 
“whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible 
concepts”; 24  and if so, then (2) “whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ 
sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible 
application.”25 Conversely, in Diamond v. Diehr,26  the Court upheld the patent 
claims of a rubber-curing process involving a computer and a well-known 
mathematical formula because the process was aimed at solving an industry-
specific problem that had not successfully been addressed.27  
 
																																																								
15 Id. at 2353. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 2354.  
18 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
19 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355–56 (discussing Bilski, 561 U.S. at 599).  
20 Id. at 2356 (discussing Bilski, 561 U.S. at 609). 
21 Id. (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611). 
22 Id. at 2357 (discussing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 1289, 1294–96 (2012)). 
23 Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298). 
24 Id. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296–97). 
25 Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298). 
26 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
27 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (discussing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177–78). 
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C.  Post-Alice: The Aftermath 
 
From the Alice decision through July 1, 2015, the Federal Circuit and district 
courts combined to invalidate 66.1% of all patents and 76.7% of all claims 
challenged under Section 101.28 And this is no initial spike. For example, through 
April 21, 2016, federal court decisions have invalidated 70% of all Section 101-
challenged patents since Alice. 29  Likewise, patent examiners have rejected a 
staggering number of applications under Section 101 since Alice.30 Broken down 
by art unit, final rejection rates under Section 101 rose between 35% and 60% in 
E-shopping, Accounting, Business Processing, Incentive Programs, Finance and 
Banking, Retail, Insurance/Health Care, Operations Research, and Reservations.31 
Reports in December of 2015 even indicated that after Alice, rejection rates for the 
top ten rejected art units under Section 101 only varied between 80% and 86%.32 
Indeed, the scope of Alice has shown to be far-reaching. 33  The next sections 
discuss the true extent of that reach—particularly in regard to the economy, patent 
applicants, and attorneys. 
 
1.  The Economy: Decreasing Value and Increasing Risk 
 
Patents are a key factor in the “economic growth and development” of a 
country. 34  Patents provide “exclusive rights for a limited period” and allow 
inventors to “recover R&D costs and investments”35 through a variety of means. 
																																																								
28 Robert R. Sachs, #Alicestorm in June: A Deeper Dive into Court Trends, and New 
Data on Alice Inside the USPTO, FENWICK & WEST: BILSKI BLOG (July 1, 2015), 
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/06/alicestorm-a-deeper-dive-into-court-trends-and-
new-data-on-alice-inside-the-uspto.html [https://perma.cc/2KMT-CNJD]. 
29 Jason Rantanen, Section 101—Pivotal Moment for Clarity on Patent Subject Matter 
Eligibility, PATENLYO (Apr. 21, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/04/section-
subject-eligibility.html [https://perma.cc/8A58-R93D]. 
30  Michael Stein, USPTO Urged to Revise Interim §101 Guidance to Require 
Examiners to Present a Proper Prima Facie Case Supported by Factual Evidence, BAKER 
HOSTETLER: IP INTELLIGENCE (March 23, 2015), http://www.ipintelligencereport.com/20 
15/03/23/uspto-urged-to-revise-interim-§101-guidance-to-require-examiners-to-present-a-
proper-prima-facie-case-supported-by-factual-evidence/ [https://perma.cc/J9P6-LW5W]; 
see also Sachs, supra note 28 (demonstrating large rate increases in final rejections under 
Section 101 for a myriad of technology art units post-Alice). 
31 Sachs, supra note 28. 
32 James Cosgrove, The Most Likely Art Units for Alice Rejections, IPWATCHDOG 
(Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/12/14/the-most-likely-art-units-for-
alice-rejections/id=63829/ (on file with the Utah Law Review).  
33 See Sachs, supra note 28. 
34  WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., Economic Development and Patents, 
http://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/developments/economic.html [https://perma.cc/6767-
Z5ZB] (last visited July 29, 2016). 
35 Id. 
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Patents “promote[] investment to commercialize and market new inventions so that 
the general public can enjoy the fruit of the innovation. Further, the [patent] system 
is designed to disseminate knowledge and information to the public through 
publication of patent applications and granted patents.”36 As a case in point, the 
U.S. patent system has until this time provided stringent protection for software 
technology.37 Such an atmosphere encouraged massive growth and innovation to 
allow America to become the world leader in software. 38  However, Alice is 
changing the outlook. 
 
Software is at the center of inventions drawn to safely landing airplanes, 
efficiently operating chemical plants, and minimizing the need for 
surgery and software is critical to our way of life. The uncertainty of the 
effects of this [Alice] decision to software startup companies is making it 
difficult for them to get investor funding and will affect our economic 
growth in innovative technologies where we lead the world.39 
 
With the investor funding pinch and rising uncertainty, particularly with 
respect to computer software, the risk is steep for entrepreneurs, solo inventors, 
small companies, and perhaps even large corporations to maintain expenditure of 
resources on development of innovation that is diminished in value or likely patent 
ineligible all together.40 So what is the result? Some practitioners submit that a 
huge sector of the American economy is at risk of stalling41 or at least falling 
behind the competition.42 “Most inventors avoid these arts and are waiting for 
further clarity,” 43  which will likely come from federal court cases and their 
																																																								
36 Id. 
37  Marian Underweiser, Alice Through the Looking Glass — The Supreme Court 




39 Robert Stoll, Where Do We Stand One Year After Alice?, LAW360 (June 17, 2015, 
8:27 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/668773/where-do-we-stand-one-year-after-alice 
[https://perma.cc/R23A-JKKH]. 
40 See John C. Jarosz & Jaime A. Siegel, Where Do We Stand One Year After Alice?, 
LAW360 (June 17, 2015, 8:27 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/668773/where-do-we-
stand-one-year-after-alice [https://perma.cc/R23A-JKKH]. 
41 See Stoll, supra note 39. 
42 See Antoinette F. Konski, Patent Subject Matter Eligibility — Impact on Litigation 
and Prosecution, NAT’L LAW REVIEW (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/ 
article/patent-subject-matter-eligibility-impact-litigation-and-prosecution [https://perma.cc/ 
N466-F5KC] (explaining how diagnostic patent filings have been delayed due to the 
necessity of first having “more data and technology . . . available to support the claims”).  
43 Richard Baker, Where Do We Stand One Year After Alice?, LAW360 (June 17, 
2015, 8:27 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/668773/where-do-we-stand-one-year-
after-alice [https://perma.cc/R23A-JKKH ]. 
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appeals44 involving the dominant players with massive software portfolios now 
under a barrage of Section 101 patent eligibility challenges.45  
 
2.  Applicants & Attorneys: Prosecution Nightmares and Rising Costs 
 
Almost wielding new power, examiners now commonly provide only 
“conclusory assertions of ineligibility” and “boilerplate language lacking specific 
evidence or analysis.”46 The increased difficulty and time required to overcome 
these vague rejections has driven up patent prosecution costs and caused great 
headache for both applicants and attorneys.47 Likewise, litigation costs are rising 
because “[f]or almost every pending software or business method patent litigation, 
defendants have revised their attack to vigorously challenge the validity of the 
patents in light of Alice, with reasonable success.”48 On the other hand, there is one 
minor advantage to Alice: Nonpracticing entities, more commonly referred to as 
patent trolls, are now very cautious to assert particular patents against operating 
companies for fear of their patents being ruled invalid.49  
With the presented background information regarding the Alice case, pre-
Alice case law, and some of the effects of Alice with respect to the economy, patent 
applicants, and attorneys, the following analysis will have appropriate context. 
 
																																																								
44 Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes Commc’ns Inc., 59 F. Supp. 3d 974, 986 (C.D. Cal. 
2014) (explaining that “by allowing ‘a period of exploratory consideration and 
experimentation by lower courts,’ the Supreme Court can have ‘the benefit of the 
experience of those lower courts’ when it revisits the issue” (quoting California v. Carney, 
471 U.S. 386, 400 n.11 (1985))); e.g., Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that “the claims are directed to a specific implementation of 
a solution to a problem in the software arts. . . . [and that] the claims at issue are not 
directed to an abstract idea”). This decision and DDR Holdings are the only Federal Circuit 
decisions upholding patent claims in view of Alice, which is why Enfish is exciting on 
many levels. One tweet read, “Enfish v. Microsoft is [m]ore [i]mportant that [sic] DDR 
Holdings—USPTO and Dist. [c]an [n]o [l]onger [a]ssume [a]ll [s]oftware is ‘[a]bstract.’” 
PatentBuddy (@patentbuddy), TWITTER (May 12, 2016, 8:46 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
patentbuddy/status/730786210537345026 [https://perma.cc/KQJ9-3QPU].  
45 See Baker, supra note 43. 
46 Stein, supra note 30. For the above stated reason, part of the 2016 USPTO guidance 
materials included a memorandum specifically addressed to patent examiners regarding 
two issues: 1) how to formulate a proper Section 101 rejection; and 2) how to evaluate an 
applicant’s response. May 2016 Subject Matter Eligibility Update, 81 Fed. Reg. 27,381 
(May 6, 2016) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
47 Stein, supra note 30. 
48 Baker, supra note 43. 
49 Padmaja Chinta, Where Do We Stand One Year After Alice?, LAW360 (June 17, 
2015, 8:27 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/668773/where-do-we-stand-one-year-
after-alice [https://perma.cc/9VJ2-HRLN]. 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
 
Noticeably absent in pre-Alice case law is any bedrock foundation on patent 
eligibility to move forward in a uniform direction. The aftermath of Alice 
exemplifies this notion and demonstrates a blatant need to address the root cause, 
namely the inadequacy of the Mayo test applied in Alice. To begin with, the Court 
has not addressed a definition of abstract,50 so it is inherently difficult at the outset 
to apply the second step of the Mayo test (i.e., sufficiently transform the abstract).51 
True assessment of this second step logically requires one to first know how 
abstract is defined in order to transform or go beyond what is abstract. Once 
adequately defined, the subjective second step of the Mayo test will still likely lead 
to inconsistent results for patent eligibility.52 This section thus suggests further 
requirements or analytical guideposts should supplement the existing Mayo test for 
determining patent eligibility. Each is discussed in turn, followed by an application 
of the proposed supplemental requirements to post-Alice decisions, alternative 
solutions, and granted patent applications.  
 
A.  No Physical Dimension 
 
To apply the first prong of the Mayo test in Alice, the Court analogized to 
Bilski’s abstract claims to hold that Alice too claimed an abstract idea, mitigating 
risk. 53  Though price hedging and risk mitigation proved to be a rather easy 
comparison for the Court,54 analogous reasoning in the future will likely not be the 
most effective way to determine abstractness.55 The Oxford Dictionary defines 
abstract as “[e]xisting in thought or as an idea but not having a physical or concrete 
existence.”56 Thus, Mayo’s patent eligibility analysis could begin as follows: an 
idea is abstract if it necessarily includes or relies on an intangible element of no 
physical dimension. This simple definition falls in alignment with the Court’s past 
holdings of abstract ideas such as settlement risk mitigation, price hedging, and 
mathematical algorithms.57 But, going forward, there will be no need to rely solely 
on analogous reasoning, rather, the Court could apply a straightforward physical 
																																																								
50 Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014). 
51 Id. at 2355 (discussing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012)). 
52 See Schreiner & McCommas, supra note 5, at 785. 
53 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2350. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. at 2357 (stating that “we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the 
‘abstract ideas’ category in this case,” while inferring it will likely be necessary at some 
point in the future (emphasis added)); see also Schreiner & McCommas, supra note 5, at 
784–85 (discussing the difficulties in patent eligibility analysis). 
56 Abstract, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/ 
american_english/abstract [https://perma.cc/Z8XB-ZKJU] (last visited Sept. 13, 2016). 
57 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2350. 
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dimension test as prescribed above. Once applied and if the claimed idea is rooted 
in an abstract form,58 the Court can then focus on the more difficult second step in 
the Mayo analysis discussed below. 
 
B.  Calculated to Quantitatively Improve 
 
The Court in Alice applied the second step of the Mayo test and held that the 
claims in question were simply conventional steps involved in risk mitigation, but 
now performed by a generic computer, which was “not enough to transform the 
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” 59  Fortunately, the Court briefly 
asserted a few examples of what may sufficiently transform the abstract.60 By 
stating Alice’s claims do not allege to improve the performance of the computer 
itself or improve another technology or technical field, the Court implied these 
instances may produce a different outcome with respect to patent eligibility.61 
However, these examples inadequately support the difficult, vague requirement in 
Mayo (i.e., sufficiently transform the abstract).62 For this very reason, the Deputy 
Commissioner for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) issued 
multiple guidance materials to help patent examiners more effectively interpret 
Alice.63 Still, this is no solution to the high degree of subjectivity involved. At best, 
the USPTO provided patent examiners a temporary band-aid.64 And at any rate, the 
USPTO guidance materials are not binding in federal court and cannot serve as a 
proper basis for appeals or petitions of review.65  
  
																																																								
58 Cf. id. at 2352 (articulating an important limitation on the notion that an invention 
includes or relies on an intangible element of no physical dimension by holding that mere 
recitation of “generic computer implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a 
patent-eligible invention”). 
59 Id. at 2351 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
60 Id. at 2359. 
61 See id.  
62 Id. at 2355 (discussing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012)). 
63 Schreiner & McCommas, supra note 5, at 784; e.g., May 2016 Subject Matter 
Eligibility Update, 81 Fed. Reg. 27,381 (May 6, 2016) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R.pt. 1); 
July 2015 Update on Subject Matter Eligibility, 80 Fed. Reg. 45,429 (Jul. 30, 2015) (to be 
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1); 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 
Fed. Reg. 74,618 (Dec. 16, 2014) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R.pt. 1); Memorandum from the 
Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination Policy to Patent Examining Corps (May 19, 2016), 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-may-2016_enfish_memo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8FLN-CE9R].  
64 See Schreiner & McCommas, supra note 5, at 784 (explaining patent examiners are 
not trained to comparatively analyze the invention in question when the Court issued no 
guidance as to a requisite degree of similarity between the invention and the examples in 
Alice). 
65 In re Smith, 815 F.3d 816, 819 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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The following modifier would help alleviate the issue of subjectivity: the 
claimed element must be calculated to quantitatively improve the examples 
provided in Alice. 66  If the claimed element were calculated to quantitatively 
improve, there would certainly be more than mere application of an abstract idea. 
There would be real numbers, statistical data, specific factual support, or some 
other evidentiary basis to show a transformation beyond the abstract and thus have 
standing as a nonabstract claim under step two of the Mayo test. The following 
examples are illustrative. 
First, a “special software that makes a laptop run 50 percent faster and 50 
percent cooler will be patent-eligible because it is actually improving performance 
of the computer.”67 Second, “a new method of processing credit card transactions 
may be patent-eligible if it can be shown to improve the speed, increase the 
accuracy, or reduce the cost of processing over the credit card networks.”68  
Third, consider the rationale behind the holding of a post-Alice case. In DDR 
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,69 the Court upheld a patent claim including a 
computer and the Internet because the claim was directed to solving a particular 
problem, specifically the “challenge of retaining control over the attention of the 
customer” when on the website. 70  Though an abstract idea, the claim was 
calculated to improve sales in a very specific manner without preempting all 
applications of the idea to “increase[e] sales by making two web pages look the 
same.”71 Essentially, the abstract idea was narrowly tailored to increase sales in a 
specific application without broadly claiming ownership over a societal building 
block like the computer or the Internet.72  
Fourth, a recent Federal Circuit decision upholding the patent claims is also 
instructive in this regard. In Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,73 the specification 
included recitations of improvement over the prior art.74 The specification further 
taught “that the claimed invention achieves other benefits over conventional 
databases, such as increased flexibility, faster search times, and smaller memory 
requirements.”75 Then responding to Microsoft’s arguments, the Federal Circuit 
held: (1) The invention’s ability to run on a general-purpose computer does not 
																																																								
66  Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2351 (providing the following examples: “[i]mprove the 
functioning of the computer itself or effect an improvement in any other technology or 
technical field”). 
67 Schreiner & McCommas, supra note 5, at 785. 
68 Id. 
69 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
70 Id. at 1258. 
71 Id. at 1259. 
72 Id.  
73 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
74 Id. at 1337 (“The present invention improves upon prior art information search and 
retrieval systems by employing a flexible, self-referential table to store data.”). 
75 Id. 
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doom the claims; 76  and (2) The improvements need not come from “physical 
components” given the nature of these advancements are often defined by “logical 
structures and processes” as opposed to “particular physical features.”77 
The remaining question is to what extent the calculated to quantitatively 
improve language should be recited in the patent claims as opposed to residing 
only in the patent’s specifications where most other factual details provide support 
to the claims. 78  The Code of Federal Regulations states “a claim particularly 
point[s] out and distinctly claim[s] the subject matter which the applicant regards 
as his invention or discovery.”79 As previously explained, abstract subject matter 
must be sufficiently transformed to be patentable; therefore, it logically follows 
that the distinction between abstract and nonabstract is at the very core of a 
potentially patentable invention and consequently should be inserted into the 
claims to comply with federal code. Thus, if the subject matter is abstract (i.e., has 
no physical dimension) then the subject matter should be expressly recited in the 
claims as calculated to quantitatively improve one of the Alice examples. Contrary 
to common practice, this notion will encourage, and in some cases require, certain 
limitations to be provided in the claim.80  
For example, if Alice invented a new method involving “XYZ,” which is 
abstract because it has no physical dimension, Alice should claim the following: a 
method comprising “XYZ,” wherein “XYZ” provides an increase in the number of 
settlement transactions performed per day due to at least a twenty-five percent 
efficiency increase in processed transactions. By expressly stating how the abstract 
invention or method is calculated to quantitatively improve the technical field of 
risk mitigation, Alice now has a much greater chance of overcoming patentability 
issues under Mayo.81 If this simple additional step is implemented during the patent 
drafting process, the high degree of subjectivity involved with the second step of 
the Mayo test can largely be eliminated.82 In addition, the assertion of quantitative 
evidence in the claims would limit the scope of patents, and in turn, work towards 
																																																								
76 Id. at 1338. 
77 Id. at 1339. 
78 See Dvorson & Davis, supra note 1, at 10. 
79 37 C.F.R. § 1.75 (2015). 
80 But see Richard V. Burgujian et al., Practical Considerations and Strategies in 
Drafting U.S. Patent Applications, FINNEGAN (Apr. 2009), 
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=80dcb48f-0cab-4dc2-
ab03-34eabfca340b (citing Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000)) (explaining how Bayer’s use of a precise range of surface areas in the claim 
limited the scope of its patent so as to allow a potential infringer escape infringement, 
which supports the widely adopted patent drafter rationale of carefully avoiding any 
limiting language where possible).  
81  See Schreiner & McCommas, supra note 5, at 784 (describing how financial 
services companies can craft patentable claims by emphasizing how they do something 
“bigger, stronger, or faster”).  
82 Id. 
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resolving “the pre-emption concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence.”83 
However, the foreseeable hang-up here will likely be the practicality of achieving a 
more ideal system in a fiercely competitive and market driven economy, where 
applicants’ claims would be limited in scope but patent eligible.84 
 
C.  Application of the Proposed Supplemental Requirements to Post-Alice 
Decisions 
 
In Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Linear LLC,85 “[t]he ‘977 Patent is directed to 
opening and closing a movable barrier, e.g., a garage door, a gate, a door, or a 
window, by sending status signals and requests over a computer network, e.g., the 
Internet.”86 The inventor wished to overcome issues stemming from human error, 
such as leaving the garage door open when the user intended it to be closed.87 So, 
advantageously to the user, the user could check to see if the garage door was left 
open, and if so, send a signal to the garage door to close itself without the user 
being physically present on-site.88 The court ruled the ‘977 patent just described as 
“directed to patent-eligible subject matter.”89 Applying the proposed supplemental 
requirements here would likely provide a similar outcome with the following 
rationale: First, “[a]n idea is abstract if it necessarily includes or relies on an 
intangible element of no physical dimension.”90 In this instant, the ‘977 patent 
claim is directed to closing a movable barrier,91 wherein the movable barrier is 
obviously a tangible element with some physical dimension. Otherwise, what 
dimensionless, intangible barrier would serve to protect our garage, cars, and 
homes? Because the movable barrier passes the simple physical dimension test, the 
second step is not applied, and the patent should be eligible under Section 101, as 
the case correctly held. 
In Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc.,92 the court held that Apple “failed to show 
that the asserted patents claim ineligible subject matter.”93 Again, applying the 
proposed supplemental requirements, the outcome here is unlikely to match the 
court’s determination. In the instant case, “the asserted claims recite methods and 
systems for controlling access to content data, such as various types of multimedia 
files, and receiving and validating payment data.”94 Going through the first step: 
																																																								
83 Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014). 
84 See Burgujian, supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
85 114 F. Supp. 3d 614 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 
86 Id. at 617. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 632. 
90 See supra Part III.A. 
91 Chamberlain, 114 F. Supp. 3d, at 617. 
92 No. 6:13CV447-JRG-KNM, 2015 WL 661174 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2015). 
93 Id. at *9. 
94 Id. at *8. 
902 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
“An idea is abstract if it necessarily includes or relies on an intangible element of 
no physical dimension.”95 Here, the claims are essentially directed to controlling 
access to digital content via a validation process.96 Not only is digital content 
intangible in its pure form, so is the validation process (e.g., payment).97  
Now to the second step: the claim language itself must demonstrate the 
invention is calculated to quantitatively improve the examples provided in Alice.98 
As stated, the claims in Smartflash do not provide any quantitative evidence that 
supports a sufficient transformation beyond the abstract.99 As such, the claims 
would not pass the quantitatively improve step and thus would constitute patent 
ineligible subject matter. In contrast, the court notes how Smartflash incorporates 
specific data and memory types in connection with use rules to determine the 
claims do contain patent eligible subject matter.100  
However, this Note maintains that it is unwise to believe courts will 
consistently and correctly reach such a determination that hinges on the subtleties 
of complex technologies and whether these technical details sufficiently transform 
the abstract. Where most judges and justices do not have any technical 
background, parties are throwing the dice when litigating patents over statutory 
subject matter.101 Very easily, another court could have sided with Apple to rule 
that Smartflash’s claims amount to nothing more than “simply payment for 
something and controlling access to something with generic implementation.”102  
Had Smartflash somehow incorporated into their claim, for example, that the 
content data memory comprises at least one hundred megabytes of data storage and 
that the flash memory comprises less than one gigabyte of data storage103 to enable 
“faster data access,” 104  there would be quantitative evidence of improvement 
supporting a sufficient transformation beyond the abstract. Though this method 
limits the scope of the claim, it is more straightforward and allows parties to rely 
less on the judgment of unskilled judges to determine whether some aspect of a 
technical limitation is a “meaningful limitation[].”105 
																																																								
95 See supra Part III.A. 
96 Smartflash, 2015 WL 661174, at *8. 
97 Id. 
98 See supra Part III.B. 
99 See Smartflash LLC, 2015 WL 661174, at *9 n.1. 
100 Id. at *9. 
101 See Sachs, supra note 28. 
102 Smartflash, 2015 WL 661174, at *8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
103 U.S. Patent No. 7,334,720 col. 18 l. 18–22 (filed Jan. 19, 2006). 
104 Id. at col. 6 l. 23–24. 
105 Smartflash, 2015 WL 661174, at *8. See also Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014), where the Court held that “a patent is invalid for 
indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the 
prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about 
the scope of the invention” and, in using this holding, applied an entirely different patent 
doctrine and standard of review but nonetheless a far greater analysis that does not leave 
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In Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank,106 Intellectual Ventures 
owned a patent relating in general terms to budgeting. 107  The court held the 
claimed subject matter in the ‘137 patent ineligible under Section 101,108 and the 
court would likely reach the same outcome under the proposed supplemental 
requirements. First, “[a]n idea is abstract if it necessarily includes or relies on an 
intangible element of no physical dimension.”109 Here, the notion of budgeting, or 
more specifically, “utiliz[ing] user-selected pre-set limits on spending that are 
stored in a database that, when reached, communicates a notification to the user via 
a device,”110 is under scrutiny. Again, recall that merely performing a function on a 
generic device cannot confer patent eligibility.111 Thus, the remaining pre-set limits 
on spending, a database, and communications—all digitized—lack any physical 
dimension.  
Second, the claim language itself must demonstrate the invention is calculated 
to quantitatively improve the examples provided in Alice.112 However, the claim 
language presented does not contain any quantitative evidence of such an 
improvement. 113  Consequently, the patent should not be patent eligible under 
Section 101. But, even further, the patent specification did not provide any 
quantitative evidence114 that could have been included in the claims themselves to 
show a sufficient transformation beyond the abstract. With so much left to prove 
and the fact that the claims capture a broad idea long-practiced that “‘could still be 
[achieved] using a pencil and paper with a simple notification device,’”115 the court 
correctly decided this case. 
  
																																																																																																																																												
interpretation of a claim’s limitation alone to a judge’s lacking skill, background, and 
understanding of complex technology. 
106 792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
107 Intellectual Ventures, 792 F.3d at 1367. 
108 Id. at 1368. 
109 See supra Part III.A. 
110 Intellectual Ventures, 792 F.3d at 1367 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
111 Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014). 
112 See supra Part III.B. 
113 Intellectual Ventures, 792 F.3d at 1367. 
114 See U.S. Patent No. 8,083,137 col. 1 l. 1–col. 9 l. 49 (filed May 26, 2009). 
115  Intellectual Ventures, 792 F.3d at 1368 (quoting CyberSource Corp. v. Retail 
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). But see California Inst. of Tech. v. 
Hughes Commc’ns Inc., 59 F. Supp. 3d 974, 994 n.19 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“Courts should not 
view software as abstract simply because it exists in an intangible form. It is as fruitless to 
say that a human could use pencil and paper to perform the same calculations as a 
computer, as it is to say that a human could use pencil and paper to write down the 
chemical structure of a DNA strand. In either case, any effort on the part of a human will 
only be a symbolic representation. The effort will not produce the same effect as executing 
a computer program or isolating a DNA strand.”). 
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In another case, Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,116 the three patents 
in suit “relate generally to the field of integrated circuit (‘IC’ or ‘chip’) design.”117 
But, more specifically,  
 
[t]he . . . patents are directed to a form of EDA known as logic synthesis. 
In the subject field, logic synthesis is generally understood to mean the 
process of using a computer tool to interpret or synthesize a human 
designer’s descriptions of the operations of the integrated circuit and then 
generating . . . the electronic circuit components . . . that perform those 
operations.118 
  
As a result, the court in this situation held that the “patents lack the inventive 
concept necessary to transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-
eligible invention.” 119  Applying the proposed supplemental requirements here 
would likely provide a similar outcome with the following rationale: First, “[a]n 
idea is abstract if it necessarily includes or relies on an intangible element of no 
physical dimension.”120 In this instant, there is no physical element besides the 
implementing computer tool that is necessarily set aside.121 Thus, the second step 
is needed, which requires evidence of a quantitative improvement in the claims.122 
However, as the claims are presently stated, there is no quantitative evidence in the 
language. 123  Consequently, the subject matter is rendered ineligible for 
patentability under Section 101 and the proposed supplemental requirements.  
However, when filed in 1995,124 the patent drafter(s) did not have the luxury 
of Section 101 guidance as provided today—particularly under Alice. Yet, this 
patent does contain a good footing, where if improved upon, would pass the 
proposed supplemental requirements and likely the subjective Alice/Mayo Test 
currently used. For example, the patent provides “only a knowledge of the desired 
operation of the resulting logic network is required to generate the logic network” 
as opposed to “the prior art methods that required at least a detailed knowledge of 
the characteristics and operations of complex logic elements such as high 
impedance drivers, level sensitive latches and edge sensitive flip-flops.”125 Such an 
improvement over the prior art would likely result in a calculable increase in 
efficiency and accuracy for the engineer or designer that could be inserted into the 
																																																								
116 Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 78 F. Supp. 3d 958, 960 (N.D. Cal. 
2015). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
119 Id. at 966. 
120 See supra Part III.A. 
121 See Synopsys, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 960–61. 
122 See supra Part III.B. 
123 See U.S. Patent 5,530,841 col. 62 l. 60–col. 64 l. 63 (filed June 6, 1995). 
124 Id. at [22]. 
125 Id. at col. 9 l. 31–38. 
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claims to constitute a quantitative improvement in compliance with the proposed 
supplemental requirements. 126  The next section discusses some potential 
alternative solutions to the prescribed Alice/Mayo Test and its proposed 
supplemental requirements.  
 
D.  Alternative Solutions 
 
In McRO, Inc. v. Naughty Dog, Inc.,127 the court engaged in an alternative 
analysis. It is implicit the court did not intend to provide a different approach based 
on its analysis.128 However, it did just that, by extending Alice’s reach, when the 
court required the claims to be analyzed in light of the prior art.129 More pointedly, 
the court noted if the abstract subject matter is the novel part of the claim and the 
nonabstract subject matter lay only in the prior art, then the claim may still be 
directed to patent ineligible subject matter.130 The court supports this approach by 
citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice to “disregard[] the presence of a 
computer in the claim given ‘the ubiquity of computers.’”131 However, at no point 
in the Alice decision does the phrase “prior art” even exist.132 Rather, Alice is 
concerned with preemption133  of entire fields and long-standing practices well 
known or fundamental to the art.134  
Contrary, prior art is much broader: “Prior art must be a reference of some 
type (i.e., a patent or a printed publication) or some type of knowledge or event 
(i.e., public knowledge, public use or a sale of a product) that demonstrates that the 
invention in question is not new.”135 So, to be precise, all fundamental building 
blocks constitute prior art, but not all prior art is considered a fundamental building 
block. For example, a fundamental economic practice like intermediated 
settlement136 would constitute prior art. But not all prior art, such as a particular 
																																																								
126 See supra Part III.B. 
127 49 F. Supp. 3d 669 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
128 See id. at 679–80. 
129 Id.  
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 679 (quoting Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 
(2014)). 
132 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2347–61. 
133 Id. at 2358 (noting it is “the pre-emption concern that undergirds our Section 101 
jurisprudence”). 
134 Id. at 2356. 
135 Gene Quinn, The Impact of the America Invents Act on the Definition of Prior Art, 
IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/10/03/the-impact-of-the-
america-invents-act-on-the-definition-of-prior-art/id=28453/ (on file with the Utah Law 
Review).  
136 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356. 
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type of anonymous matching system,137 would amount to a fundamental building 
block in economics.  
In failing to make this distinction, the court in the instant case accidentally 
created an alternative approach to the prescribed test in Alice. This alternative 
approach appears to go beyond the mark intended in Alice and requires an 
extensive analysis into the prior art,138 and one if used, should go beyond the few 
references admitted as prior art. 139  However, at that point, the analysis would 
encroach on the duties of a patent examiner assessing patentability140 by requiring 
courts to participate in a redundant, rigorous analysis of prior art that is already 
beyond Alice’s intended scope.141 In short, this approach extends Alice too far and 
appears impractical if performed correctly. And in this case, it was not correctly 
performed due to the court’s failure to analyze the prior art beyond what was 
submitted by the applicant.142  
DDR Holdings provides another alternative solution to the Alice predicament. 
According to DDR Holdings, a patent applicant can use the specification as a 
sword to defend the patent by engaging in a “problem-solution approach to define 
what is ‘new and useful.’”143 This approach would entail pointing to the particulars 
of the specification that demonstrate a direct response to actual problems 
experienced by those in the field.144 Alternatively, or in addition to the proposed 
supplemental requirements, the court could “provide the 101 analysis with an 
																																																								
137 See U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479, fig. 12 (filed May 28, 1993) (citing as prior art U.S. 
Patent No. 5,136,501 (filed May 26, 1989)). 
138 See McRO, Inc. v. Naughty Dog, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d 669, 677–84 (C.D. Cal. 
2014). 
139 See id. at 682 (“One unintended consequence of Alice, and perhaps of this and 
other decisions to come, is an incentive for patent applicants to say as little as possible 
about the prior art in their applications.”). 
140 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a)(1) (2015) (“On taking up an application for examination 
or a patent in a reexamination proceeding, the examiner shall make a thorough study 
thereof and shall make a thorough investigation of the available prior art relating to the 
subject matter of the claimed invention.”). 
141 See Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 78 F. Supp. 3d 958, 964 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) (citing Cogent Med., Inc. v. Elsevier Inc., 70 F.Supp.3d 1058, 2014 WL 4966326, at 
*4, n.3 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 30, 2014) (“As one district court has noted, ‘[i]t is important to 
distinguish novelty and obviousness from the ‘inventive feature’ inquiry required by the 
Supreme Court in Alice.’”). But cf. Jason Rantanen & Ben Roxborough, Guest Post: The 
Blurring of §§ 101 and 103—A Double-Edged Sword that Cuts the Other Way, 
PATENTLYO (Oct. 6, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/10/blurring-%C2%A7%C2% 
A7-double.html [https://perma.cc/3A3A-9RSG] (“First . . . the Supreme Court and Federal 
Circuit have said that § 101 is facilitated by considerations analogous to those of § 103. 
Second, teaching away analysis should not be monopolized by § 103 . . . . Because 
teaching away analysis is transferable between different sections in the statute . . . .”).  
142 McRO, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 677–84. 
143 Rantanen & Roxborough, supra note 141 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).  
144 Rantanen & Roxborough, supra note 141. 
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objective baseline [by] . . . defin[ing] who the skilled artisan is—and what she 
knew at the time of the invention.”145 Since many Section 101 cases are decided in 
the early stages of procedure, plaintiffs are often precluded from providing 
evidence regarding the skilled artisan, 146  which is arguably prejudicial to the 
plaintiff’s case: “To guard against early Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the skilled artisan’s 
background should be described in the complaint (or even the patent itself).”147  
In another test, “sometimes referred to as the Blue Pencil Rule, [the test] 
conceptually removes all non-statutory elements of the claim. The examination 
would then proceed with this purified form of the claim.”148 In other words, “no 
matter how novel the combination of non-statutory elements is, the proposed test 
will never reconsider an element once it is removed.”149 Other solutions may be 
more dramatic. For example, one author calls for the complete abandonment of the 
abstract idea itself in order to resolve the Alice mess.150 Or perhaps, part of the 
solution lay in plain view of Section 101 history, specifically, “[t]he machine-or-
transformation test [that] once was the gatekeeper of patent eligibility . . . .”151 
“The two prongs of the machine-or-transformation test are whether the claimed 
process (1) is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) transforms a 
particular article into a different state or thing.”152 The machine-or-transformation 
test was greatly diminished when the Supreme Court stated in Bilksi that it was not 
to be the sole test for assessing patentability.153 However, a post-Alice decision by 
the Federal Circuit recently brought the machine-or-transformation test back to life 
																																																								
145 Rantanen & Roxborough, supra note 141. 
146 Rantanen & Roxborough, supra note 141. 
147 Rantanen & Roxborough, supra note 141. 
148 Kelly Fermoyle, Adapting Alice: How to Formulate a Repeatable Test Based on 
Alice v. CLS Bank, 6 CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 201, 233 (2015) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
149 Id. 
150 Annal D. Vyas, Alice in Wonderland v. CLS Bank: The Supreme Court’s Fantastic 
Adventure into Section 101 Abstract Idea Jurisprudence, 9 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 17–
18 (2015); cf. Ryan Davis, Kappos Calls for Abolition of Section 101 of Patent Act, LAW 
360 (Apr. 12, 2016, 4:32 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/783604/kappos-calls-for-
abolition-of-section-101-of-patent-act [https://perma.cc/3ZGZ-9DU4 ] (“The former 
director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on Monday called for the abolition of 
Section 101 of the Patent Act, which sets limits on patent-eligible subject matter, saying 
decisions like Alice on the issue are a ‘real mess’ and threaten patent protection for key 
U.S. industries.”).  
151  Justin M. Sobaje, Has the Machine-or-Transformation Test Returned to 
Prominence in Patent Cases?, IP LITIGATION CURRENT (Jan. 29, 2015), 
https://www.iplitigationcurrent.com/2015/01/29/has-the-machine-or-transformation-test-
returned-to-prominence-in-patent-cases/ [https://perma.cc/Q3RE-QAPV]. 
152  Id. (citing Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716–17 (Fed. Cir. 
2014)). 
153 Id.  
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by showing the “test can provide a ‘useful clue’ in the second step of the Alice 
framework.”154  
In Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, the patent in suit is “directed to a method 
for distributing copyrighted media products over the Internet where the consumer 
receives a copyrighted media product at no cost in exchange for viewing an 
advertisement, and the advertiser pays for the copyrighted content.”155 The court 
held that the subject matter was not patent eligible under Section 101 because the 
individual steps were routine and conventional and thus could not transform the 
abstract idea.156 However, the court did not stop here. The court further engaged in 
the machine-or-transformation test.157  
Under the first prong of the test, the court stated that the claims “are not tied 
to any particular novel machine or apparatus, only a general purpose computer.”158 
The rationale was simple: The ubiquitous nature of the computer and mere 
inclusion of the Internet is not enough to confer patentability.159 Under the second 
prong of the test, the transformation prong was not satisfied because the 
“manipulations of ‘public or private legal obligations or relationships, business 
risks, or other such abstractions . . . are not physical objects or substances, and they 
are not representative of physical objects or substances.’”160 Though an abrupt 
reversion to the old machine-or-transformation test would likely be insufficient to 
determine patentability, 161  the machine-or-transformation test could provide 
another solid factor in addition to the proposed supplemental requirements for 
assessing patentability issues. 
 
E.  Granted Patent Applications: Two Case Studies 
 
VMware, a global leader in cloud infrastructure and business services, 
recently applied for a patent entitled: “Identifying Code That Exhibits Ideal 
Logging Behavior.” 162  A quick analysis under the proposed supplemental 
																																																								
154 See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716 (quoting Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life 
Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
155 Id. at 712.  
156 Id. at 715–16.  
157 Id. at 716–17. 
158 Id. at 716.  
159 Id. at 716–17 (citing CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 
(2014)). 
160 Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 717 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 
2008)). 
161 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010). 
162 U.S. Patent Application No. 14/458,303 (filed Aug. 13, 2014), http://portal.uspto. 
gov/pair/PublicPair (enter the verification code seen in the image into the blank field, and 
click continue; then with the “Application Number” bubble selected, type in the application 
number without any punctuation or slashes; then click the search button; the title then 
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requirements, show in effect, the original claims are directed to the abstract idea of 
analyzing, assigning, and ranking methods.163 As such, the claims do not include or 
rely on any tangible element of some physical dimension.164 Likewise, the claims 
do not include evidence of a quantitative improvement to demonstrate a sufficient 
transformation beyond the abstract.165 So, how exactly did VMware overcome the 
patent examiner’s Section 101 rejection that issued in the first office action?166 
First, VMware argued that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, but more 
specifically that the claims were not directed to organizing human activity or a 
mathematical relationship as the office action alleged. 167  In support of this 
argument, VMware asserted that methods inside source code are operations 
executed by computers, which can, for example, “contain log statements that cause 
the computer to print information in a log file during the execution of the 
method.”168 Notwithstanding the fact that source code was written by a human, 
these are computer operations, and thus the claims “cannot possibly be considered 
[as organizing] ‘human activities.’”169 Similarly, VMware argued that the claims 
cannot be directed to a mathematical relationship because representative “[c]laim 1 
does not contain any mathematical equation with variables or formulas.”170  
Second, VMware argued that even if the claims were directed to an abstract 
idea, the amended claims add meaningful limitations that would transform the 
																																																																																																																																												
appears next to the application number above the row of tabs and above all the application 
data). 
163 U.S. Patent Application No. 14/458,303 (filed Aug. 13, 2014) [hereinafter USPA 
No. 14/458,303], http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (enter the verification code seen in 
the image into the blank field, and click continue; then with the “Application Number” 
bubble selected, type in the application number without any punctuation or slashes; then 
click the search button; then click the tab “Image File Wrapper”; then click or download 
the desired document, in this case the original “Claims” document filed 08-13-2014). 
164 See USPA No. 14/458,303, supra note 163. 
165 See USPA No. 14/458,303, supra note 163. 
166 USPA No. 14/458,303, supra note 163, at “Non-Final Rejection” document filed 
06-01-2015, 3–4. 
167 USPA No. 14/458,303, supra note 163, at “Applicant Arguments/Remarks Made 
in an Amendment” document filed 08-31-2015, 9–10. Note that the USPTO in their 
guidance materials to examiners developed four categories within the abstract ideas realm: 
(1) fundamental economic practices, (2) certain methods of organizing human activity, (3) 
an idea of itself, and (4) mathematical relationships/formulas. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, JULY 2015 UPDATE: SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY 4–5 (2015), http://www.uspto. 
gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-2015-update.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2A8-FB3Z]. 
168 USPA No. 14/458,303, supra note 163, at “Applicant Arguments/Remarks Made 
in an Amendment” document filed 08-31-2015, 9. 
169 USPA No. 14/458,303, supra note 163, at “Applicant Arguments/Remarks Made 
in an Amendment” document filed 08-31-2015, 9. 
170 USPA No. 14/458,303, supra note 163, at “Applicant Arguments/Remarks Made 
in an Amendment” document filed 08-31-2015, 10. 
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claims into patent-eligible subject matter.171 To start, “[t]he claims recite many 
components which are not part of a generic computer,” including a processor for 
processing the source code and a static cell graph data structure containing 
elements that would not be found in any generic computer.172 Additionally, the 
narrowing limitations provided by the amendments insert the claims into a niche 
not covering any abstract idea.173 Based on these arguments, VMware overcame 
the Section 101 rejection and was awarded the patent.174  
In another patent application, this time assigned to eBay, “the invention is 
directed to a method of converting ‘unstructured’ text into ‘structured’ text in the 
context of an online marketplace for selling goods.”175 The examiner rejected the 
claims as a fundamental economic practice: selling items without significantly 
more than a generic implementation.176 And as with the previous case study, the 
claims do not include or rely on any tangible element of some physical dimension 
nor do the claims include evidence of a quantitative improvement to demonstrate a 
sufficient transformation beyond the abstract. 177  However, eBay successfully 
responded to the Section 101 rejection in three parts. First, eBay argued the claims 
are not directed to an abstract idea (i.e., selling items).178 In support, eBay argued 
the claims are directed to “extracting textual semantics and utilizing textual 
semantics” as indicated by the title, the “TECHNICAL FIELD” section in the 
specification, and the specification itself. 179  The words “selling” and “items,” 
individually or combined, are not found in either the title or TECHNICAL FIELD 
																																																								
171 USPA No. 14/458,303, supra note 163, at “Applicant Arguments/Remarks Made 
in an Amendment” document filed 08-31-2015, 10. 
172 USPA No. 14/458,303, supra note 163, at “Applicant Arguments/Remarks Made 
in an Amendment” document filed 08-31-2015, 10. 
173 USPA No. 14/458,303, supra note 163, at “Applicant Arguments/Remarks Made 
in an Amendment” document filed 08-31-2015, 10. 
174 See USPA No. 14/458,303, supra note 163, at “Notice of Allowance and Fees Due 
(PTOL-85)” document filed 12-08-2015. 
175  Ryan M. Corbett, Overcoming Section 101 Rejections: A Case Study, INSIDE 
COUNSEL (May 13, 2015), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/05/13/overcoming-section-
101-rejections-a-case-study [https://perma.cc/PSM5-FYDH]. 
176 Id. 
177  See U.S. Patent Application No. 12/938,592 (filed Nov. 3, 2010) [hereinafter 
USPA No. 12/938,592], http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (enter the verification code 
seen in the image into the blank field, and click continue; then with the “Application 
Number” bubble selected, type in the application number without any separating 
punctuation or slashes; then click the search button; then click the tab “Image File 
Wrapper”; then click or download the desired document, in this case the “Claims” 
document filed 07-21-2014, upon which the Section 101 rejection was subsequently given).  
178  USPA No. 12/938,592, supra note 177 at the “Applicant Arguments/Remarks 
Made in an Amendment” document filed 02-02-2015, 13–15. 
179 USPA No. 12/938,592, supra note 177, at the “Applicant Arguments/Remarks 
Made in an Amendment” document filed 02-02-2015, 13. 
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section in the specification.180 And though these words are present in other parts of 
the specification, eBay demonstrated that the patent application provides a solution 
to the problem of unstructured text. 181  At the crux of the argument, eBay 
demonstrates that the problem of unstructured text also exists in noncommercial 
environments, which contradicts the examiner’s conclusory determination that the 
claims are directed to selling items.182 
Second, eBay attacks the examiner’s procedural approach.183 To show a lack 
of adherence to procedure, eBay: (1) requested the examiner to identify what claim 
language describes “selling items”; (2) distinguished the analysis in Alice and 
Bilski from the examiner’s analysis; and (3) cast doubt on “selling items” as a 
fundamental economic practice.184 Third and finally, eBay argued in the alternative 
that there are limitations in the claims, without amendment and with amendment, 
that add significantly more than the alleged abstract idea.185 Among other specific 
arguments tailored to the limitations provided, eBay analogizes to DDR Holdings 
and Dier; DDR Holdings to show the claims are not covering routine or 
conventional use of the Internet; and Dier to show the claimed transformation from 
unstructured text to structured text is patentable subject matter.186 After subsequent 
consideration by the examiner, the claims were allowed. 187  In hindsight, a 
takeaway from this patent application might include “focusing on the technological 
problem solved by the invention, drafting claims so as to not recite a judicial 
exception, and perhaps piggybacking off of allowable claim limitations . . . to 
overcome Section 101 rejections.”188 
  
																																																								
180 USPA No. 12/938,592, supra note 177, at the “Applicant Arguments/Remarks 
Made in an Amendment” document filed 02-02-2015, 13–14. 
181 USPA No. 12/938,592, supra note 177, at the “Applicant Arguments/Remarks 
Made in an Amendment” document filed 02-02-2015, 14. 
182  USPA No. 12/938,592, supra note 177 at the “Applicant Arguments/Remarks 
Made in an Amendment” document filed 02-02-2015, 15. eBay accomplishes this objective 
by a clever example that articulates the same difficulty arising from unstructured text in an 
entirely noncommercial environment, namely identifying qualified recipients for donor 
body parts. Id. 
183 USPA No. 12/938,592, supra note 177, at the “Applicant Arguments/Remarks 
Made in an Amendment” document filed 02-02-2015, 16. 
184  USPA No. 12/938,592, supra note 177 at the “Applicant Arguments/Remarks 
Made in an Amendment” document filed 02-02-2015, 16–17. 
185  USPA No. 12/938,592, supra note 177 at the “Applicant Arguments/Remarks 
Made in an Amendment” document filed 02-02-2015, 18–23. 
186  USPA No. 12/938,592, supra note 177 at the “Applicant Arguments/Remarks 
Made in an Amendment” document filed 02-02-2015, 18–23. 
187 USPA No. 12/938,592, supra note 177, at the “Notice of Allowance and Fees Due 
(PTOL-85)” document filed 2-27-2015. 
188 Corbett, supra note 175. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
In short, the two-step analysis in Mayo is insufficient to objectively analyze 
and make consistent determinations on patent eligibility.189 The effects of Alice are 
prime exhibits of this conclusion. Uncertainty and confusion in the realm of 
patents and software technology have risen to such a level that there is a telling 
impact on the economy and perhaps far greater devastation to the economy on the 
horizon. 190  At the same time, the patent prosecution process has become 
increasingly expensive and difficult for both the client and drafting attorney 
provided the sheer number of Section 101 rejections that are challenging to 
overcome. 191  Consequently, this Note contends that two supplemental 
requirements would assist in remedying the Alice predicament.  
To start, the Court in Alice should have created a meaningful definition of 
abstract to supplement the first prong in the Mayo test as opposed to solely using 
case analogy.192 For instance, an idea is abstract if it necessarily includes or relies 
on an intangible element of no physical dimension.193 This definition approach in 
the future will greatly reduce the subjectivity that is typical of comparative analysis 
between inventions with subtle yet significant differences.194 Under step two of the 
Mayo test, Alice’s examples of transformations beyond the abstract should be 
modified with terms that demonstrate a calculated and quantifiable improvement 
to the examples.195 This supplemental language should be inserted into the claim 
language itself, which will ensure that the patent applicant has demonstrated a true 
basis for going beyond the abstract.196 At the same time, this language will remove 
a great deal of subjectivity in the patent eligibility analysis. 197  These two 
supplemental requirements to the first and second prong of the Mayo test are not 
comprehensive, but both provide a better foothold going forward in an age when 
technology is becoming more and more abstract.198  
If these proposed supplemental requirements are not implemented, other 
analytical methods in their various forms may provide alternative solutions to the 
Alice predicament.199 One method requires the claims to be analyzed in light of the 
prior art, and other methods simply strike out from the claims what is abstract 
subject matter.200 There is the problem-solution approach as well as the age-old 
																																																								
189 See supra Parts III.A–B; supra notes 5, 55, 64 and accompanying text. 
190 See supra Part II.C. 
191 See supra Part II.C. 
192 See supra Part III.A; supra notes 5, 55 and accompanying text. 
193 See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
194 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
195 See supra Part III.B. 
196 See supra Part III.B.; see supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
197 See supra Part III.B. 
198 See supra Parts III.A–B. 
199 See supra Part III.D. 
200 See supra Part III.D. 
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machine-or-transformation test. 201  Other approaches call for the complete 
abandonment of the Alice/Mayo Test.202 Though there might not be a definitive 
solution, other solutions are certainly out there. And a mixing and matching of the 
factors historically used, ones now relied upon, and others of sound judgment may 
provide the best solution yet.  
																																																								
201 See supra Part III.D. 
202 See supra Part III.D. 
